Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan GRIP 2017

For the Russian gas supply disruption to the Baltic States, the remaining flexibility is 0% for all cases with 1-day design case demand and for the year 2017. Results show that the projects listed in all three infrastructure scenarios help to increase the remaining flexibility for the following years. The only exception is again the low+GIPL scenario for the year 2025, in which case the remaining flexibility goes back to 0%. This is because the model assumes that the Klaipėda LNG terminal will stop operat- ing in 2024 since the current lease contract will elapse in this year. It highlights the fact that the GIPL alone cannot provide sufficient gas supplies for the Baltic States in cases of serious disruption. For Russian disruptions of gas supply to Finland and the Baltic States, the situation remains similar as in the previous disruption case – the remaining flexibility is low in 2017 for high-gas demand periods, but the projects in all three infrastructure scenarios help to increase the remaining flexibility for the following years. Disrupted Rate For all three infrastructure scenarios with a 1-day design case, a disrupted rate occurs for Estonia in 2017. The only exception where no disruption occurs is for the supply disruption from Belarus to Lithuania. This implies that further infrastructure projects are needed to help Estonia to deal with peak demand situations in case of gas supply disruptions from Russia. The projects modelled in the infrastructure scenarios for the following years help to decrease the disrupted rate to zero in most cases. The scenario where a disrupted rate still occurs is for the low+GIPL scenario in the year 2025. The reason is the same as mentioned before – the model assumes that the Klaipėda LNG terminal will stop operating in 2024. The same conclusion can be derived here as with the remaining flexibility, namely that GIPL alone is not sufficient as an alternative supply source for Estonia during high-gas demand periods and gas supply disruptions. In order to have no disrupted rate, in addition to GIPL, intercon- nectors like Balticconnector and potentially LNG terminals are needed.

6.3 Finland

Remaining Flexibility Since Finland is supplied by a single supply source (Russia) until the Balticconnec- tor pipeline between Finland and Estonia is commissioned (estimated in 2020), it is evident that Finland’s remaining flexibility is zero in all cases where supply from  Russia is disrupted. This does not mean that Finland’s security of energy supply is endangered, since it has a rather extensive back-up fuel system relying on biogas, LNG and alternative fuels. When fuel supply disruptions do not impact Finland (i. e., “No RU supply to the Baltic States” and “No supply from BY to LT” cases), the remaining flexibility is always above zero for Finland which means that the supply is sufficient to cover all gas needs in the country and hence there is sufficient flexibility. When comparing the Blue Transition and Green demand scenarios with each other, it can be seen that the remaining flexibility is higher in the Green demand scenario and thus the supply capacity is higher in demand than in the Blue Transition scenario. In the infrastructure scenario where the Balticconnector is in place by 2025, the remaining flexibility for the 14-day demand case remains above zero also in cases where gas supplies from Russia to Finland are disrupted. This is not the case for the demand situation design case, where the remaining flexibility is still zero in Russian gas supply disruption. If GIPL pipeline (and other PCIs in the region) exists and the

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BEMIP Gas Regional Investment Plan 2017